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Re: Compilers make a system less secure?

On Tue, May 02, 2006 at 09:33:48AM -0400, jared r r spiegel wrote:
>   i am not asserting that the compromise-pack did not have
>   a precompiled sshd binary for openbsd ( the prior hop
>   up the compromise chain in this case was a debianlinux ),
>   but if it didn't, it may not have rooted machine B.

  to clarify that (coffee), without a compiler on B, the autobot
  may not have been able to infect the sshd running on machine B
  like it did.  naturally it still had root level access since the
  user whose UN/PW it got from the machine A had sudo on machine B,
  but whether or not the autobot was smart enough to do anything
  with is a different facet.

  i find it worth mentioning that not using common passwords
  between different hosts ( the user's password on A and B were
  the same, in despite of the UN being different -- but iirc
  it grabbed the right username for B out of .ssh/config ) 
  would've made the autobot's attack unable to gain access
  to B at all.
  ... not using common passwords and also never using passphraseless
  keys for accessing a host on which that user has root/sudo...

  not having a compiler on B in this case, again, would not
  change the fact that we considered B to be compromised and
  planned to offline it and reinstall/etc, but it, from looking
  at the history file for the user and /var/log/secure for 
  the sudo commands, didn't have it in its bag of tricks to
  be able to *infect* host B if B didn't have a compiler on it.
  ( and thus make B a further bastion for infection spreading
    because anyone who ssh'd into B and hit 'yes' after 
    the "omg known host key changed" warning would have their
    password then "harvested" and if their .ssh/* had login
    info for other remote hosts on which they did have sudo,
    the autobot would have probably been able to gain access
    and possibly infect those hosts as well ).

  to emphasize, this appears to have been in no way a
  supervised attack targeted specifically at B; but rather
  a blind infecto-bot following its success-path.

  if we didn't have that little PIII/450 sitting next to the
  machine now, for the purposes of bringing live, getting
  patches onto, making .tgzs, and then copying them over to
  untar onto host B, what bob beck criticized about would be
  entirely accurate about me.



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