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Re: Security Flaw in Popular Disk Encryption Technologies
- To: Atom Smasher <atom_(_at_)_smasher_(_dot_)_org>
- Subject: Re: Security Flaw in Popular Disk Encryption Technologies
- From: Pieter de Boer <pieter_(_at_)_thedarkside_(_dot_)_nl>
- Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2008 19:40:53 +0100
- Cc: hackers_(_at_)_freebsd_(_dot_)_org
Atom Smasher wrote:
The attack you're referencing is carried out by cold rebooting a system.
Simply put: pull power cord, insert power cord. The volumes are never
detached, as the shutdown sequence is never run.
article below. does anyone know how this affects eli/geli?
from the geli man page: "detach - Detach the given providers, which
means remove the devfs entry and clear the keys from memory." does that
mean that geli properly wipes keys from RAM when a laptop is turned off?
This attack has to be defended against in hardware; it exploits a
'feature' of modern day RAM chips, which can not be controlled by
software. Anything that is in RAM when the attack is carried out, will
be compromised. As encrypted volumes simply require keys to be in memory
to be able to use the volumes, the encryption software is vulnerable to
this attack. I see no reason why GELI/GBDE wouldn't be affected.
A possible counter-measure would be to add wiping features to the RAM
modules themselves. When power is lost, the memory could wipe itself.
Still not perfect, but would certainly help.
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